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Available online 31 December 2008onships and violations of those relationships is fundamental to learning about the
world around us. Over time some of these relationships become so ﬁrmly established that they form part of
an implicit belief system about what is possible and impossible in the world. Previous studies investigating
the neural correlates of violations of learned relationships have focused on relationships that were task-
speciﬁc and probabilistic. In contrast, the present study uses magic-trick perception as a means of
investigating violations of relationships that are long-established, deterministic, and that form part of the
aforementioned belief system. Compared to situations in which expected causal relationships are observed,
magic trick perception recruited dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC),
brain regions associated with the detection of conﬂict and the implementation of cognitive control. These
activations were greater in the left hemisphere, supporting a role for this hemisphere in the interpretation of
complex events. DLPFC is more greatly activated by magic tricks than by surprising events, but not more
greatly activated by surprising than non surprising events, suggesting that this region plays a special role in
causality processing. The results suggest a role for cognitive control regions in the left hemisphere in a
neurobiology of disbelief.
© 2008 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Understanding causal relationships and violations of those
relationships is fundamental to learning about the world around us.
Whilst for the most part we are unaware of the importance of
understanding and perceiving these relationships their importance
soon becomes apparent when watching a magic trick in which causal
relationships are violated. Imagine the following scenario: A magician
places a coin in his right hand and then closes his hand. You are
conﬁdent the coin is in his right hand; you are as sure as if you had put
it there yourself. The magician waves his left hand over his right hand
and then slowly opens his right hand to reveal that the coin has
disappeared. Your reaction to this magic trick is likely one of
astonishment and disbelief. According your implicit system of
knowledge the disappearance of the coin should not have been
possible, as no force was seen acting upon it. Thus what you have
witnessedwill violate several causal relationships that you have learntGrant Number 072082/Z/03/Z
at Psychology Research Group,
B, UK. G. Kuhn, Department of
Parris),
license.through past experience. Moreover, you are now likely to try and
understand the real causal sequence of events (Kelly, 1980). These
violations in causality and expectations are at the heart of magic
performances (Kuhn et al., 2008a,b; Kuhn and Land, 2006), and the
aim of the present studywas to usemagic tricks as a tool to investigate
the neural correlates of long-established and deterministic causal
relationships that form part of a belief system about the world and
how it works.
Previous research has used violations in learned associative
relations to investigate the cognitive and neural processes underlying
causality perception and inference (Fletcher et al., 2001; Fugelsang
and Dunbar, 2005; Fugelsang et al., 2005; Hauser and Spaulding,
2006). In one such study (Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2005), the authors
investigated the neural roots of biases in causal reasoning. In their
study, subjects were asked to interpret data relative to plausible and
implausible theories. The plausibility of the theory was manipulated
by presenting participants with a brief introductory statement that
contained either 1) a direct causal mechanism of action linking a red
pill to a mood outcome (e.g. the red pill was described as being able to
chemically facilitate the feeling of happiness), or 2) no direct causal
mechanism of action linking the red pill to mood outcome (e.g. the red
pill was described as being unlikely to chemically facilitate the feeling
of happiness). The datawere presented such that they were consistent
or inconsistent with the causal theory provided; thereby providing
1034 B.A. Parris et al. / NeuroImage 45 (2009) 1033–1039instances of both violated and upheld causal relationships. Evaluation
of data consistent with a plausible theory recruited neural tissue in the
parahippocampal gyrus, which is associated with learning and
memory. Evaluating data that was inconsistent with a plausible
theory recruited the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and left dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), areas associated with error detection
and conﬂict monitoring (Kerns et al., 2004; Van Veen and Carter,
2006).
In another study involving causality violations, participants
learned associations between drugs and syndromes (Fletcher et al.,
2001). Activity in the DLPFC was related to learning these associations
and also to violations of the learned causal relationships. It was argued
that this activity was related to the adaptation of associative
relationships in response to unexpected occurrences, and that the
activations were surprise-dependent. The present study builds on this
research by investigating a different type of causality violation. The
associations violated in the studies of Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005)
and Fletcher et al. (2001) were task-speciﬁc and probabilistic. In the
present study, we investigated violations of cause–effect associations
that are long-established and deterministic. In doing so, we extend the
utility of studying causality violations by relating them to situations in
which observers experience disbelief because the violated associa-
tions form part of a belief system about possible and impossible causal
relationships in the world.
The activation of the DLPFC and the ACC in previous studies of
causality violations is important because these brain regions have been
implicated in a cognitive control loop inwhich the ACC is responsible for
monitoring for conﬂict whilst the DLPFC resolves it. The ACC activations
in the study by Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) were interpreted by the
authors and subsequently by other researchers (Van Veen and Carter,
2006) as being associated with the detection of conﬂict between an
expected cause and effect relationship and the actual cause and effect
relationship that was observed. DLPFC activations were interpreted as
the subsequent inferential process; an attempt to resolve the conﬂict.
Similar processes were expected to be activated during magic trick
perception. Evidence in support of this would be indicative of a role for
these structures in a neurobiology of disbelief.
A causality violation is also a surprising event and so it is likely that
the two events share similar neural correlates. However, surprise can
follow from events in which there are no violations of causality,Table 1
Examples of the clips seen in the experimental conditions
Magic condition Causal control con
A cause–effect relationship is violated The cause–effect re
trick is upheld
Disappearing coin A coin is placed on the table and is covered
by the magician's hand. The magician appears
to rub the coin into the table. He lifts his hand
to reveal that it has disappeared.
A coin is placed on
magician's hand. T
coin into the table
Disappearing glass A glass is covered with a napkin. The magician
hits the top of the napkin which immediately
crumples to the table. The glass has disappeared.
A glass is covered
the top of the napk
the glass undernea
Disappearing silk The magician pushes a silk handkerchief into his
closed hand. The closed hand opens to reveal the
handkerchief has disappeared.
The magician push
closed hand. The c
handkerchief.
Levitation The magician crumples up a paper napkin and
places it in his hand. He then moves his hand
downwards whilst the napkin remains in its
place, apparently levitating.
The magician crum
places it in his han
downwards; the n
Changing bill A £5 note is folded and unfolded. Upon unfolding
it is revealed that the £5 note is now a £10 note.
A £5 note is folded
Torn and restored
cigarette
The magician tears a cigarette into two pieces and




in pieces.suggesting that there are at least some brain regions that are speciﬁc
to its detection. Studies have implicated ventro-lateral prefrontal
cortex (VLPFC; BA45/7) in processing surprising stimuli/events (Braver
et al., 2001; Michelon et al., 2003; Parris et al., 2007). These studies
have involved the presentation of rare and unusual stimuli, which
suggests that VLPFC activations are related to arousal/evaluative
mechanisms, whilst DLPFC activationsmay be related to a deeper level
of encoding for the purposes of learning from novel/unexpected
events (Fletcher et al., 2001; Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2005; Fugelsang
et al., 2005).
In the present study, 25 participants saw 39 video clips while
undergoing functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). The clips
included 13 magic tricks (the “Magic” condition), as well as 13 clips
from each of two control conditions (see Table 1 for a description of
selected tricks and controls used in the experiment). An example clip
from the Magic condition involves the magician placing a coin in his
hand, closing it, and then re-opening it to reveal that the coin is no
longer there. The “Causal Control” condition provided a baseline
condition that did not involve a causality violation. The Causal Control
counterpart to the above example involves themagician putting a coin
in his hand and closing it as before, but this time when he opens his
hand the coin is still there. The purpose of the “Surprise” condition
was to dissociate the detection of causality violations in magic tricks
from the detection of alerting or surprising events. In this condition,
participants viewed clips of the magician performing an unusual
actionwith one of the objects seen in themagic trick. For example, the
magician is seen placing a coin in his hand, but then removing it from
his hand and placing it in his mouth.
Methods
Participants
25 (17 female) right-handed volunteers ranging in age from
18–34 years (mean age 20.3).
Stimuli
45 video clips were produced showing either magic tricks (Magic
condition), visually similar action sequences without a magic trickdition Surprise condition
lationship violated in the magic Something unusual and unexpected happens,
but cause–effect relations are upheld
the table and is covered by the
he magician appears to rub the
. He lifts is hand to reveal the coin.
A coin is placed on the table and is covered by
the magician's hand. The magician appears to
rub the coin into the table. He lifts his hand to
reveal the coin. A third hand then swipes in and
removes the coin.
with a napkin. The magician hits
in which maintains the shape of
th.
A glass is covered with a napkin. The magician
pushes the napkin covered glass off the table.
es a silk handkerchief into his
losed hand opens to reveal the
After a similar beginning, the magician
unexpectedly puts a silk handkerchief in
his mouth. He completes the sequence with the
‘end of trick’ hand gesture (showing his palms
to the observer).
ples up a paper napkin and
d. He then moves his hand
apkin moves with the hand.
The magician crumples up a paper napkin and
places it in his hand. He then unexpectedly
ﬂicks the napkin from his hand. He completes
the sequence with the ‘end of trick’ hand gesture.
and unfolded. A 5 pound note is torn in two. He completes the
sequence with the ‘end of trick’ hand gesture.
a cigarette into two pieces and
through his hand and emerges
The magician uses the cigarette like a comb.
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seen in the magic tricks (Surprise condition). Each of the 15 clips in
each condition were rated by 23 independent observers for how
surprising they were, howmuch they involved illusion, and the extent
to which the observed events violated the laws of physical causality,
using a scale from 1–7 (7 being the most surprising, involving a strong
illusion, and strongly violating causality). Each magic clip was
presented in a block with its related clip from the Surprise and Causal
Control conditions. The ratings were taken after a single viewing of
each clip. On average the 15 video clips used in the Magic condition
were rated 4.4 for surprise, 5.4 for illusion, and 4.7 for causality
violation. The 15 clips in the Causal Control and Surprise conditions
were rated 1.8, 1.3, 1.1 and 2.7, 1.1, 1.1, respectively. Two of the magic
tricks were not rated as sufﬁciently violating cause and effect
relationships (rating lower than 2.5) and so these clips and their
associated controls were not used in the experiment.
Participants in the fMRI study did not rate the clips. However, the
ratings from the independent observers were entered into a reliability
analysis to determine the extent to which ratings were likely to be
consistent across different groups. All items in all conditions were
found to have a Corrected Item-Total Correlation N0.4, and a
Cronbach's Alpha value N0.9 showing that the item ratings were
reliable and consistent across subjects. No item in any condition was
found to dramatically improve Cronbach's Alpha value if deleted.
The obtained ratings were used to determine the comparisons
made. For example, although the Surprise condition was rated as
being less surprising than theMagic condition (pb0.01) it was rated as
being signiﬁcantly more surprising than the Causal Control condition
(pb0.001) and thus enabled us to compare the Surprise to the Causal
Control condition to identify the neural correlates of surprise. The
Magic condition was signiﬁcantly more surprising, involved greater
amounts of illusion and was in greater violation of cause and effect
relations than all other conditions (pb0.001).
In order to capture the moment the magic tricks were perceived as
such, a further 10 participants who did not take part in the fMRI study
were asked towatch themagic tricks and to press a key on a keyboard,
as quickly as they could, the moment they realized a magic trick had
occurred. Reaction times from these observers were averaged and
were used to determine the onset time for event related regressors in
the fMRI analysis (see Data analysis).
Task and procedure
All participants saw all magic clips and their relevant controls once
only. 13 clips were used in all conditions. Each magic clip was
presented in a block with its related clip from the Surprise and Causal
Control conditions. The order of presentation within and betweenFig. 1. A schematic of the sequenceblocks was randomised. Participants were initially presented with the
outline of a white rectangle (the same size and shape as the video
clips) on a black background. This outline was presented for 1000 ms,
1300 ms, or 1550 ms and was followed by the presentation of a clip.
The clips varied in length from 9000–22,000 ms. Following the clip, a
blank (black) screen was presented for 1000 ms, 1300 ms, or 1550 ms
(see Fig. 1).
To ensure participants remained attentive for the duration of the
experiment, participants were given one of two simple tasks to
perform following the blank period. Half the participants were
presented with a colour patch at ﬁxation for 2000 ms following the
blank period and were instructed to press a response key with their
right hand if the patch was blue and a different response key with
their right hand if the patch was white. The other participants were
not presented with the coloured patch but instead saw the question
‘Did you see a magic trick?’ displayed in the centre of the screen for
2000 ms and indicated a Yes/No response by pressing the left/right
response key (the mapping of response keys to the Yes/No decision
was randomized across subjects). These two task types were included
because we were interested in whether the experimental setting
altered the experience of magic trick perception. By setting two tasks,
one which of was designed to encourage participants to adopt an
attentional set in which they actively looked out for magic tricks on
each trial (responding to the question), we were able to assess
whether attentional set inﬂuences the activations observed in the
experiment. Between-subjects t-tests revealed that although some
activation differences were observed between the two judgment tasks
(in the lentiform nucleus (24 −7 18) and the cuneus (−12 −71 16) for
the Magic condition and the middle occipital gyrus (−30 −84 −1) for
the Causal Control condition), no differences were observed in a priori
regions of interest (deemed to be of interest based on previous
neuroimaging studies; see fMRI analysis section below) such as the
DLPFC which has been associated with reasoning. The ﬁnding of no
differences in a priori areas between the two tasks suggests thatmagic
trick perception recruits similar brain regions under differing
attentional sets. For this reason, the data reported below are collapsed
across task type.
fMRI data acquisition
Scanning was performed on a 1.5 T Philips Gyroscan magnet at the
Peninsula MRI research centre, University of Exeter, UK. A T2⁎-
weighted echoplanar sequence was used (TR=3000 ms, TE=50 ms,
ﬂip angle 90°, 32 transverse slices, 3.6×3.6×4 mm, ascending
acquisition). 350 volumes were acquired per subject. An additional 5
“dummy” scans were performed at the start of each block prior to the
start of the stimulus sequence.of events in the experiment.
Table 2
Comparisons: paired-sample t-tests, voxel cluster threshold 30, pb0.0001, uncorrected
X Y Z T-value Z-value Neuroanatomical location
MagicNCausal Control −24 12 53 5.66 4.47 Left superior frontal gyrus BA6
−22 37 39 4.50 4.21 Left middle frontal gyrus BA8
−42 23 23 4.69 3.91 Left middle frontal gyrus BA46
−4 38 16 5.53 4.40 Left anterior cingulated BA32
MagicNSurprise −42 24 23 4.86 4.02 Left middle frontal gyrus BA46
4 33 32 4.76 3.95 Right medial frontal gyrus BA9
34 52 −1 4.61 3.86 Right middle frontal gyrus BA10
−44 −46 52 6.20 4.74 Left inferior parietal lobe BA40
44 −46 54 5.90 4.59 Right inferior parietal lobe BA40
26 −72 35 5.38 4.32 Right precuneus BA19
−32 −49 32 5.08 4.14 Left supramarginal gyrus BA40
−31 30 −15 6.32 4.80 Left inferior frontal gyrus BA47
SurpriseNCausal Control −4 56 30 4.77 3.96 Left superior frontal gyrus BA9
−4 −50 41 4.55 3.83 Left precuneus BA7
2 19 25 5.64 4.46 Right anterior cingulated BA24
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Data were analysed using SPM2 software (www.ﬁl.ion.ucl.ac.uk/
spm). The images were realigned, unwarped to remove variance
caused by movement-by-ﬁeld-inhomogeneity interactions, normal-
ised to a standard EPI template, and smoothed with a Gaussian kernel
of 6 mm full-width at half maximum. Statistical regressors were
generated by convolving a canonical hemodynamic response function
with a series of discrete event onset times (0ms duration), time locked
to the presentation of video clips in the Magic, Causal Control and
Surprise conditions. The exact timing of each event onset relative to
clip onset times was based on the reaction time of magic/non magic
judgments obtained from viewers prior to scanning (see Stimuli
above). A general linear model approach was used to estimate
parameter values for each regressor. The analyses generated a series
of “t contrast images” for each effect and subject which were entered
into a 2nd level (“random effects”) analysis consisting of one-sample
t-tests with a hypothesised mean of 0 (thresholded at p=0.001,
uncorrected). To further protect against the probability of type 1 error,
we employed an extent voxel threshold cut-off of 30. This combina-
tion of intensity and extent thresholds produces a per voxel false
positive probability of b0.000001 (Forman et al., 1995). Two sample
repeated measures t-tests with a statistical threshold of pb0.001,
uncorrected, and a voxel cluster size threshold of 30 were alsoFig. 2. A comparison between Magic and Causal Control conditions revealed activations in le
dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; −4 38 16), cognitive control regions in the left hemisperformed on the MagicNCausal Control, MagicNSurprise, and
SurpriseNCausal Control. These analyses were conﬁned to regions of
interest (ROIs) as deﬁned by the WFU Pickatlas tool (Maldjian et al.,
2003). The ROIs chosenwere the frontal, parietal, and limbic lobes and
were selected on the basis of having been implicated previously in
studies investigating detecting causality violations (Fletcher et al.,
2001; Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2005). The X,Y,Z coordinates of all
activation clusters were transformed from normalized MNI space (i.e.
SPM coordinates) toTalairach space (www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk/Imaging/
mnispace.html) in order to ascertain the site of activation relative to the
atlas of Talairach and Tournoux, (1988).
Results
To identify neural activations associated with violations of
causality a paired-samples t-test between the Magic and Causal
Control conditions was performed (see Table 2 for a list of activation
sites from all comparisons). This contrast yielded signiﬁcantly greater
activations in three areas in left DLPFC including the superior frontal
gyrus (BA6), and two areas on the middle frontal gyrus (BA8, BA46;
see Fig. 2). Furthermore, signiﬁcantly greater activations were
observed in the left dorsal ACC (BA32). These areas are consistent
with previous studies investigating the neural correlates of causality
violations (Fletcher et al., 2001; Fugelsang and Dunbar, 2005).ft dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; x, y, z Talairach coordinates −42 23 23) and left
phere suggesting a role for these regions in a neurobiology of disbelief.
Fig. 3. (A) A comparison between the Magic and Surprise conditions revealed activations in left dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex (x, y, z Talairach coordinates, −42 24 23). (B) A
comparison between the Surprise and Causal Control condition reveals activations in ventral anterior cingulate cortex (x, y, z Talairach coordinates, 2 19 25) and left ventral prefrontal
cortex (−31 30 −15), but not in DLPFC, further supporting the inference that DLPFC plays special role in detecting violations of causality.
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established, deterministic associations, these activations suggest that
ACC and DLPFC in the left hemisphere play a role in the neurobiology
of disbelief.
To determine which neural regions were recruited by surprising
events a comparison was made between the Surprise and Causal
Control conditions (see Fig. 3A). The analysis revealed signiﬁcantly
greater activations in left VLPFC (inferior frontal gyrus; BA47), left
dorso-medial PFC (superior frontal gyrus; BA9), right ACC (BA24), and
the left precuneus (BA7). These results support a role for ventral and
dorsal regions of the prefrontal cortex in the processing of surprising
stimuli/events (Braver et al., 2001; Parris et al., 2007). As with the
comparison between the Magic and the Causal Control conditions,
ACC and PFC showed activations in the present comparison, suggest-
ing that the same regions are activated in situations in which
expectancies, and not just causal relations are violated. Importantly,
however, no activations were observed in DLPFC for this comparison,
suggesting this region plays a special role in processing causality
violations.
To identify which of the neural regions implicated in magic trick
perception plays a special role in processing causality violations, a
comparisonwas made between the Magic and Surprise conditions (see
Fig. 3B). The comparison revealed signiﬁcantly greater activations in
left DLPFC (BA46), right dorso-medial PFC (BA9), right DLPFC (BA10),
right precuneus (BA19), and further areas in the parietal lobe bilaterally
(BA40). Of particular relevance is left DLPFC; this area has not been
implicated in processing surprising events in this study, but has been
implicated in magic trick perception. This again suggests that left
DLPFC (BA46) plays a special role in processing violations in causality.
Discussion
In contrast to previous neuroimaging studies of violations of
causality the present study violated causal associations that were
deterministic and long-established, rather than probabilistic and task-
speciﬁc. In comparison to events in which causal relations were
upheld, magic trick perception was associated with greater activation
in left dorso-lateral prefrontal and left anterior cingulate cortices. In
Fugelsang and Dunbar's (2005) study involving causality violations,
ACC activations were interpreted as being associated with the
detection of conﬂict between the expected and observed causal
relations whilst the DLPFC activations were interpreted as being
associated with reasoning about the observed events, since theiractivations were greater in the left hemisphere, which has been
shown to be involved in interpreting complex actions and events
(Gazzaniga, 2000; Roser et al., 2005). Attributing such roles to the ACC
and left DLPFC is also possible in the present study, and indeed the
violation of causality observed in magic tricks can be considered
similar to Fugelsang and Dunbar's theory-inconsistent condition in
that participants will have had a prior theory or belief about what
causal relationships are possible or not. Left hemisphere activity in
this context may represent an attempt to assign a cause to the effects
observed in magic tricks and as such may be seen to represent an
attempt to resolve the conﬂict between what is observed and what is
thought to be possible.
Previous research has shown that ACC and DLPFC are activated in
situations of response conﬂict, in which the relevant and irrelevant
dimensions of a stimulus activate conﬂicting responses (Kerns et al.,
2004; MacDonald et al., 2000). Under these conditions the ACC is
thought to detect the conﬂict and the PFC implicated in resolving it
(Kerns et al., 2004; Van Veen and Carter, 2006). An important question
remains, however, as towhether this control loop plays awider role in
cognitive phenomena (Van Veen and Carter, 2006). The present
results indicate a role for these regions in detecting conﬂict resulting
from the comparison of beliefs with observed events (note that the
activations reported in our study could not index response conﬂict),
supporting the possibility that these structures play awider role in the
architecture of cognition. In line with this ﬁnding, a recent study
separated the decision and response phases of a decision task, and
showed that ACC also indexes conﬂict at the decision stage (Ponchon
et al., 2008).
Despite observing DLPFC activity, Fletcher et al. (2001) did not
observe activity in ACC in their study when expected causal sequences
were violated. However, Fugelsang and Dunbar (2005) did, but only
when the violated associative causal relation was underpinned by a
plausible theory linking the cause and the effect. Presumably the
plausible theory increased the magnitude of the violation by
embedding the causal relation within a knowledge base. Our results
also show ACC activation in response to a violation of strong causal
relations, raising the possibility that only those causal relationships
bound by a theory or belief appear to activate ACC when violated.
Importantly, the ACC and the PFC were also activated by surprising
events. Both ventro-lateral PFC (VLPFC) and ACC activations were
observed in the comparison between the Surprise and the Causal
Control conditions. Since both magic tricks and surprising events
involve violations of expectancies, these results suggest that the
1038 B.A. Parris et al. / NeuroImage 45 (2009) 1033–1039cognitive control loop may be activated when there is strong conﬂict
between expectations and observed events. Such a role is consistent
with the strong connections between ACC and sensori-motor cortices
because unexpected events often require the ﬂexible control of action.
Although ACC has not previously been implicated in processing
surprise, the veridical, real-world nature of the surprising events
presented in the present study (i.e. real physical manipulation of 3D
objects, rather than abstract computer-generated stimuli) might have
resulted in stronger surprise responses than those elicited in other
studies involving unexpected events/stimuli (Braver et al., 2001;
Michelon et al., 2003; Parris et al., 2007). Critchley (2005) and
Critchley et al. (2003, 2005) have observed that ACC activity closely
predicts measures of autonomic arousal and have suggested that ACC
regulates autonomic arousal to accommodate cognitive tasks and thus
would be expected to be observed in response to alerting events. This
theory of ACC function is not incompatible with the notion that it is
important in the detection of conﬂict (Carter and Van Veen, 2007). In
addition, this theory accounts well for the possibility that ACC activity
appears to be related to the strength of the violated causal relationship
in that the stronger the causal relationship the more alerting or
arousing would be a violation of that relationship.
The capacity to detect information that contradicts or challenges
an established system of knowledge is crucial for learning about the
world around us. The notion that ACC activity is a function of the
extent of the contradiction suggests it that it might play a role in a
neurobiology of disbelief. A recent study has shown ACC and PFC
activation when deﬁning a propositional statement as false (e.g.
‘Wisconsin is on the west coast of the United States’; Harris et al.,
2008). These activations were not observed when deﬁning proposi-
tional statements as true. These results suggest that these structures
play a role in establishing the veracity of information in the sense of
registering whether the information conﬂicts with pre-existing
knowledge. Magic trick perception likewise involves a strong notion
that what is observed is impossible and must therefore be false and
disbelieved. Taken together, these results suggest that PFC and ACC
activity might play an important role in learning from situations that
conﬂict with existing knowledge, situations one would expect would
lead to the experience of disbelief or a judgment of falsity. However, an
equally relevant ﬁnding from Harris et al. is that ACC activation was
also prominent when participants were uncertain about the veracity
of a statement, suggesting that the ACC activity observed in the
present study could be due to the likely experience of being uncertain
about what was observed after perceiving a magic trick.
The ﬁnding of ACC and PFC activity in both the Magic v Causal
Control comparison and the Surprise v Causal Control comparison is
mitigated by the ﬁnding that different parts of the PFCwere associated
to these two event types: Dorso-lateral PFC with magic trick
perception, and, consistent with previous research, ventro-lateral
PFC with the perception of surprise events that do not involve a
causality violation (Braver et al., 2001; Parris et al., 2007). This result
indicates that VLPFC activations are related to arousal/evaluative
mechanisms, whilst DLPFC activationsmay be related to a deeper level
of encoding for the purposes of learning from novel/unexpected
events. It is also important to note that whilst violations of causality
can be seen as a subset of violations of expectancy— in that a causality
violation generally violates our expectancies — our results suggest
that brain areas responsible for detecting expectancy violations in
general (i.e. ACC and VLPFC) are not responsible for detecting causality
violations in particular; this function is speciﬁc to DLPFC. Interestingly,
the right inferior middle frontal gyrus locus of activity speciﬁc to the
Magic versus Surprise comparison lays within BA10, an area thought
to play a role in switching attention between stimulus-oriented and
stimulus-independent thought (e.g. Gilbert et al., 2005). Detection of
causality violationsmay require both attention to an external stimulus
and its evaluation relative to an internal representation of beliefs
about the world.The inclusion of the Surprise condition in the present study
represents an improvement over previous studies investigating
causality violations because it allows us to dissociate the detection
of causality violations from the detection of alerting or surprising
events. However, the Magic condition was rated as being signiﬁcantly
more surprising than our Surprise condition which means that left
DLPFC activity observed in the Magic v Surprise comparison could be
due to greater levels of surprise in theMagic condition. This possibility
is rendered less likely given that left DLPFC was not more greatly
activated by the Surprise than the Causal Control condition. In
addition, our results indicate a special role for VLPFC in processing
alerting or surprising events. Nevertheless, future studies need to
further investigate whether the neural regions underlying causality
violations dissociate from those involved in the detection of surprising
events before any strong conclusions can be drawn.
One ﬁnal implication of the present results relates to hemispheric
specialization. Gazzaniga (2000) proposed that the left hemisphere is
responsible for interpreting complex stimuli and actions. Exploring this
idea Roser et al. (2005) tested two callosotomy patients on tasks
involving causal perception and causal inference. Their results showed
that the direct perception of causality and the ability to infer causality
depend on different cerebral hemispheres; the right and left hemi-
spheres, respectively. In the present study the Magic vs. Causal Control
comparisonproduced activations in the left hemisphere only suggesting
that these activations in some way reﬂect an inference process. The
present experiment did not require participants to report on their
thoughts after seeing the magic trick so we cannot make any strong
conclusions as to the nature of the processes reﬂected in these
activations, but such clear hemispheric lateralization, which was also
observed in a post-hoc whole brain analysis (in fact there were no
additional areas of activation in the whole brain analysis of this
comparison), is unusual and suggestive of a unique function associated
with left hemisphere processing such as interpreting complex stimuli
and events (Gazzaniga, 2000) and reasoning (e.g. Goel et al., 1998).
The results from the present study show that DLPFC and ACC are
activated by conﬂict between expected and observed events. The
notion that they are involved in detecting conﬂict in this broad sense is
important for understanding the importance of these structures in our
cognitive architecture (Van Veen and Carter, 2006). These activations
were conﬁned to the left hemisphere, supporting a role for this
hemisphere in the interpretation of complex events. DLPFC is more
greatly activated by magic tricks than by surprising events, but not
more greatly activated by surprising than unsurprising events,
suggesting that this region plays a special role in causality processing.
The impossible nature of the causality violations used in the present
experiment suggests a role for cognitive control regions in the left
hemisphere in a neurobiology of disbelief.
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